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Good volatility, bad volatility: What drives the asymmetric 
connectedness of Australian electricity markets? 
 
 
Abstract 
Efficient delivery of network services and the electricity infrastructure to meet the 
long-term consumer’s interests are the main objectives and the strategies of a national 
electricity market, while the main interests of generators are to maximize their profit 
through pricing strategies. Therefore, the objective of this study is to explore whether 
electricity prices across the four Australian States display symmetric price volatility 
connectedness. The study is the first attempt in the literature to make use of intraday 
5-minute Australian dispatch electricity prices, spanning the period December 8th, 
1998 to May 5th, 2016 to quantify asymmetries in volatility connectedness emerging 
from good, and bad volatility. The results provide supportive evidence that the 
Australian electricity markets are connected asymmetrically implying the presence of 
some degree of market power that is exercised by generators across regional 
electricity markets.  
Keywords: Electricity prices; volatility spillovers; semivariance; asymmetric effects; 
Australia National Electricity Market 
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1. Introduction 
The literature has extensively explored volatility spillovers across energy (or energy 
commodity) markets. According to Sattary et al. (2014), there is a rapidly growing 
literature which addresses linkages across oil and stock markets in terms of volatility 
spillovers. Certain studies focus on such spillovers across regions like Asia, the U.S. 
and the U.K. Their findings provide supportive evidence of the presence of volatility 
spillover linkages, mostly over the post-crisis period (In, 2007; Alsubaie and Najand, 
2009; Moon and Yu, 2010; Arifin and Syahruddin, 2011; Gebka, 2012; Zheng and 
Zuo, 2013; among others). There is also a strand of literature that corroborates the 
significance of volatility spillovers across European stock markets in the light of oil 
prices (Giannellis et al., 2010; Arouri et al., 2012; Antonakakis, 2012; Tamakoshi and 
Hamori, 2013; Reboredo, 2014), while a third strand explores extensive volatility 
spillover comparisons among different countries (Serra, 2011; Korkmaz et al., 2012; 
Krause and Tse, 2013; Salisu and Mobolaji, 2013). A number of recent studies 
investigate the behavior of U.S. stock markets and sector indices depending on oil 
behavior, while they provide positive evidence of the presence of transmissions of 
volatility and shocks across oil markets and relevant sectors (Malik and Ewing, 2009; 
Du et al., 2011; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012; Liu et al., 2013). Finally, there is a 
methodological strand of the literature that focuses on the comparison of econometric 
methodologies used to measure volatility spillovers, along with the presence of 
asymmetric effects across and within energy, such as oil and natural gas, markets 
(Chang et al., 2010; Sadorsky, 2012; Ewing and Malik, 2013). 
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It is important to examine the dynamics of volatility spillovers across 
electricity markets to add knowledge of the information transmission channels on 
Australian national electricity markets. According to Higgs (2009), the Australian 
electricity markets are characterized by the limitations of the interconnectors across 
the member states, indicating that the Australian regional electricity markets are 
relatively isolated. The absence of convergence has been also confirmed by the study 
of Apergis et al. (2017). It is generally accepted that in electricity markets, supply or 
demand shocks, say due to the presence of unexpected outages of generation units or 
transmission constraints cannot be fully compensated in the short run. As a result, 
sudden jumps in prices (i.e., spikes) usually occur, especially in the cases when 
reserve capacity is limited, which is the case for electricity markets across Australia 
(Apergis et al., 2017). Given that the electricity market is perceived to have a high 
level of exposure to external shocks, such market contains significant market risk 
level. Therefore, accurately measuring the downside market risk exposure represents a 
pivotally important and difficult practical problem for suppliers and consumers in the 
electricity market and, hence, electricity prices are expected to be very volatile and 
pose a huge risk for those market participants. In addition, such findings will allow 
further the study of the differences in volatility across the Australian electricity 
markets and to provide evidence on whether price volatility across those markets is 
high and/or persistent either in the real time market or in the day-ahead market. 
Furthermore, the findings will allow a more consistent manner in further forecasting 
electricity price volatility, while will also allow to measure the market risk level and 
to analyze the risk evolution which is expected not only to efficiently analyze the 
heterogeneous market structure, but also to improve the risk measurement accuracy 
(Deng and Oren, 2006; Pineda and Conejo, 2012). Therefore, it is expected that the 
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documentation of volatility spillovers will shed further light on the understanding of 
the dynamics of electricity pricing, and further on the efficiency of pricing, given that 
the Australian state electricity markets are identified as centralized markets which still 
are primarily composed of commercialized and corporatized public sector entities. 
The findings in relevance to the presence of such spillovers will also benefit the 
proper evaluation as a step towards higher levels of regional electricity markets 
integration. 
The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) is currently operating as a 
nationally interconnected grid and interconnecting five state-based regional markets 
(i.e., Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania) , while 
NEM covers about 40,000 km of transmission lines. The main domestic network is 
the National Electricity Market (NEM), which was established in 1998 and links 
regional markets in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and, more recently, 
Tasmania and South Australia. Both producers and retailers trade through a spot 
market operated by the Australian Energy Market Operator. Our study does not cover 
Western Australia (WA). WA’s main wholesale market is the South West 
Interconnected System (SWIS), which covers the area of Perth and surroundings and 
is operated by WA’s Independent Market Operator (IMO). In WA, there is no existing 
interconnection with any other power system outside the state. The lack of 
interconnection capacity between the SWIS and the rest of Australia does not allow 
for arbitrage of electricity prices, at least in the short run.  
The goal of the paper is to extend Higgs’ (2009) work and undertake a 
research effort for the first time, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the presence of 
asymmetries in volatility spillovers across Australian electricity markets. This is also 
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the first study that uses 5-minute high frequency data to capture more information in 
relevance to the dispatched price data. Investigation towards the presence of 
asymmetric volatility spillovers seems to be substantially important because spillovers 
that are asymmetric tend to be a source of contagion, which could have important 
implications towards the implementation of energy and electricity policies. It is highly 
possible that in certain conditions, especially in the phase of expanding electricity 
demand, the electricity market in a certain region looks as if it is not related to the 
market of another region, which could be more advanced. The concept of asymmetric 
volatility spillovers comes from the financial literature. In particular, there have been 
two competing hypotheses that provide the theoretical background for the presence of 
such asymmetric volatility spillovers: the leverage hypothesis effect, according to 
which negative returns increase financial leverage, causing volatility to rise (Christie, 
1982; Schwert, 1989), and the volatility feedback effect, according to which if the 
market risk premium is an increasing function of market volatility, anticipated 
increases in volatility raise the required returns on equity, leading to immediate 
declines of stock prices (Campbell and Hentschel, 1992). The findings in the case of 
electricity prices are expected to be very helpful in designing efficient electricity 
trading rules, leading to an efficient, as well as integrated electricity market.  
Whereas asymmetric volatility in financial markets has long been recognized 
as a stylized fact (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Pindyck, 1984; French, Schwert, and 
Stambaugh, 1987), question if these asymmetries propagate to other assets, or 
markets, have not yet received the same attention. Since large literature documents 
how volatility transfers across different assets and markets, it is worth assuming that 
volatility spillovers exhibit asymmetries as well and such asymmetries might stem 
from qualitative differences due to bad and good uncertainty. Segal, Shaliastovich, 
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and Yaron (2015) provide precise definitions, and coin bad uncertainty as the 
volatility that is associated with negative innovations to quantities (e.g., output, 
returns) and good uncertainty as the volatility that is associated with positive shocks 
to these variables. Barunik, Kocenda, and Vacha (2015, 2016) hypothesize that 
volatility spillovers might substantially differ depending on nature of these shocks. 
They suggest how to quantify the asymmetries in volatility spillovers originating due 
to bad and good uncertainty as defined by associated with negative and positive 
shocks to volatility (as defined by Segal, Shaliastovich, and Yaron, 2015). In addition, 
Barunik, Kocenda, and Vacha (2015, 2016) document asymmetries in volatility 
spillovers in financial assets as well as petroleum markets.  
 The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
data set used in the empirical analysis, and provides the description of the 
methodologies used. Section 3 reports the empirical results, and finally, Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
The paper employs high frequency data on electricity dispatched price 
obtained from the Electricity Market Management Company, and the prices are in 
Australian dollars per megawatt hour (MWh). The time resolution of the data is 5 
minute basis, representing 288 trading intervals in each 24-hour period. The spot price 
is where market generators are paid for the electricity they sell to the pool and market 
customers pay for their electricity consumption from the pool. All electricity is traded 
through the pool at the spot price. The pool is defined into a number of pre-defined 
regions. A dispatch price for each region is determined every 5 minutes, and the 6 
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dispatch prices in a half-hour period are averaged to determine the regional spot price 
for that half-hour trading interval.  
AEMO uses the spot price to settle all energy traded in the NEM.  In other 
words, the wholesale market of the NEM is operated as a real-time energy market 
through the centrally coordinated dispatch system to match demand and supply 
instantaneously in real time.  The dispatch price for each 5 min interval is the one of 
the last bid that matches demand at time period t. The dispatch electricity prices, 
spanning the period from December 8th, 1998 to May 5th, 2016
i
, are obtained and the 
asymmetric spillover effects between electricity markets across four Australian 
regions, i.e. Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, are 
examined using the squared realized variance (i.e. RV) time series in a logarithm form.  
 
2.1.Measuring asymmetric volatility spillovers 
This sub-section aims at defining a measure of asymmetries in volatility 
spillovers. In their seminal works, Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) developed a 
volatility spillover index based on forecast error variance decompositions from vector 
autoregressions (VAR) to measure extend of transfers among markets. Consecutive 
large strand of literature extended this approach in various ways incorporating 
covariances, or frequency dependent shocks to the analysis (among many see for 
example McMillan and Speight, 2010; Kumar, 2013; Fengler and Gisler, 2015; 
Barunik and Krehlik, 2016; and Krehlik and Barunik, 2017). Despite its versatility, 
the spillover measures do not distinguish the potential asymmetry in originating due 
to bad and good uncertainty associated with negative and positive shocks to volatility. 
                                                          
i
 Data can be downloaded from http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/National-Electricity-Market-
NEM/Data-dashboard 
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An important extension has been proposed in this direction by Baruník, Kocenda, and 
Vacha (2016), who showed how to quantify asymmetries due to negative and positive 
shockls. A new spillover asymmetry measure (SAM) combines two methodological 
concepts (i.e. realized semi-variance and volatility spilover index) to capture 
asymmetric volatility spillovers using high-frequency data.  
Under the assumption of continuous-time stochastic process for the dispatch 
price in the logarithm form (i.e. pt) evolving over a time horizon [0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇], pt 
contains a continuous component, as well as a pure jump component such that the 
data generating process (GDP) can be written as: 
𝑝𝑡 = ∫ 𝜇𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + ∫ 𝜎𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑊𝑠 + 𝐽𝑡                                                                     (1) 
where  in Equation (1) denotes a locally bounded predictable drift process,  
represents a strictly positive volatility process (i.e. >0), and 𝐽𝑡 jumps; note that all 
process is governed by the common filtration ℱ. The quadratic variation associated 
with the log-prices pt  is then: 
[𝑝𝑡,𝑝𝑡] = ∫ 𝜎𝑠
2𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + ∑ (∆𝑝𝑠)
2
0<𝑠<𝑡                                            (2) 
where ∆𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠−  are jumps in the above process. The measure for quadratic 
variation, formally termed as “realized variance” (RV),ii has been formalized as the 
sum of squared returns. Let us assume the intraday dispatch electricity log prices for a 
particular Australian state p0,…, pn are equally spaced on the [0, 𝑡] interval, such that 
the realised variance can be defined as: 
𝑅𝑉 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖−1)
2𝑛
𝑖=1  . (3) 
                                                          
ii
 For details please refer to Andersen et al. (2001) and Barndorff-Nielsen (2002).  
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RV converges in probability to the quadratic variation of log-prices pt  in Equation (2) 
with growing number of intraday observations, 𝑛 → ∞. Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2010) 
further introduce measure that decomposes RV to components due to solely positive 
returns or negative returns, coined the name “realized semivariance” (RS) :  
RS+ = ∑ (pi − pi−1)
2n
i=1 I(pi − pi−1 ≥ 0)      (4) 
RS− = ∑ (pi − pi−1)
2n
i=1 I(pi − pi−1 < 0)   (5) 
Note that the realized semivariances provide a complete decomposition of the realized 
variance, such that the summation of  RS
+
 and RS
- 
 is always equal to as RV (i.e. RV 
= RS++ RS−)iii.  It is further proved for the limiting behavior of realized semivariance 
of convergence to 1/2 ∫ 𝜎𝑠
2 𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 and the sum of the jumps attributed to positive and 
negative returns. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the estimated annualized 
realized variances.  SA displays the highest price volatility while NSW the lowest 
(Panel A, Table 1). One interesting observation is that RV originated from positive 
price returns is higher than volatility originated from negative returns (Panels B-C, 
Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
2.2. Measuring volatility spillovers 
This sub-section describes how to measure volatility spillovers by adopting the 
method of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), hereafter DY09, and to measure the magnitude 
of volatility spillovers across Australian National Electricity markets. The measures 
introduced by the authors are based on forecast error variance decompositions from 
Vector Autoregressive regressions (VARs). This measure is a simple and direct way 
                                                          
iii We can treat RS+ and RS-  measures of upside and downside risk respectively.  
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of quantifying the amount of volatility spillovers in the system (i.e., the Australian 
National Electricity markets).  The methodology of variance decompositions quantify 
how much of the h-step ahead forecast error variance of some electricity market i is 
due to innovations in another market j. However, two crucial limitations of DY09 are 
first that the employment of Cholesky-factor identification of VARs leads to the 
resulting variance decompositions dependent on variable ordering, and second, this 
methodology allows measuring total spillovers in the system only (Baruník, Kocenda, 
and Vacha, 2016). Subsequently, Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), hereafter DY12, 
address the above limitations by using a generalized VAR framework in which the 
forecast error variance decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering and the 
model is also capable of measuring directional volatility spillovers. The DY 
methodologies have been widely applied to the equity markets literature (Yarovaya, 
Brzeszczynski and Lau, 2016). The use of high-frequency data can further improve 
the understanding of the transmission mechanism on volatility spillovers. To the best 
of our knowledge there has been no study employing 5-min Australian electricity 
dispatch data to enhance our understanding of the geography of the market 
interconnectedness, as well as the time-varying nature of the spillover effects. 
Furthermore, our study is the first attempt to decompose daily volatility into positive 
and negative semivariance, offering a proxy for upside and downside, respectively, 
risk to measure the magnitude of spillovers across electricity markets from good and 
bad volatility.  For the purpose of measuring the intensity of good and bad volatility 
we have total volatility spillovers denoted by 𝑅𝑉𝑡 = (𝑅𝑉1𝑡,⋯,𝑅𝑉𝑛𝑡)
′
; 𝑅𝑆𝑡
+ =
(𝑅𝑆1𝑡
+ , … , 𝑅𝑆𝑛𝑡
+ )′ for positive semivariance; and 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− = (𝑅𝑆1𝑡
− , … , 𝑅𝑆𝑛𝑡
− )′ for negative 
semivariance.  In the following sections we will construct tables for volatility 
spillovers so as to visualise the channels and the dynamics of spillover effects across 
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electricity markets. To this end, we consider a N-dimensional vector of realized 
variance, 𝑅𝑉𝑡 = (𝑅𝑉1𝑡,⋯,𝑅𝑉𝑛𝑡)
′
 in N different markets, such that a covariance 
stationary of N-variable VAR (p) can be specified as: 
RVt = ∑ 𝛷iRVt−i
p
i=1 + εt                                                                                   (6) 
where RVt is a vector of realized variance of electricity markets, 𝛷i is for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝 
parameter matrices, and εt ~ (0, Σε) is an independently and identically distributed 
disturbance. Given that the VAR process is invertible, the moving average 
representation of the VAR model yields: 
RVt = ∑ Ai
∞
i=0 εt−i                                                                                            (7)                             
where the 𝑁𝑥𝑁 matrices holding parameters Ai can be retrieved from the recursion:  
Ai = ∑ 𝛷j
𝑝
𝑗=1 Ai−j with  A0 being the  N×N identity matrix and Ai= 0 for i < 0.  The 
measure of DY12 spillovers index is built on the idea of computing the fraction of the 
h-step-ahead error variance in forecasting the ith variable that is attributed to the jth 
variable for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, for each iiv.  The methodological framework of Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) examines how a variable RVi depends on its own shocks, as well as on total 
volatility spillovers. The adopted generalized VAR process is built on Koop, Pesaran, 
and Potter (1998) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) h-step-ahead forecast errors (KPPS 
hereafter), which are invariant to variable ordering, and can be defined for h = [1, 
2…+∞), as: 
ϑij
g(H) = 
σjj
−1 ∑ (ei
′AhΣεej)
2H−1
h=0
∑ ( ei
′AhΣεA
′
hei)
H−1
h=0
                                                                                          (8) 
                                                          
iv
  Essentially, it follows the N-variable VAR variance decompositions methodology by Sims (1980) 
for each variable 𝑅𝑉i  to be added to the fraction of its h-step-ahead error forecasting variance, 
associated with shocks in relevance to the variable 𝑅𝑉j (where ∀i ≠ j for each observation). The cross 
variance fraction contains information on spillovers from one market to another.  
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where Σε is the variance matrix for the error vector ε; σjj is the standard deviation of 
the error term for the jth equation;  ei  is the selection vector, with one as the i th 
element, and zero otherwise. ∑ ϑij
g
(H)Nj=1 ≠ 1  as the shocks are not necessarily 
orthogonal in this framework. The normalization of each entry of the variance 
decomposition matrix by the row sum provides:  
ϑ̃ij
g(H) =  
ϑij
g
(H)
∑ ϑ
ij
g
(H)Nj=1
                                                                                                      (9) 
where ∑ ϑ̃ij
g
(H)Nj=1 = 1 and ∑ ϑ̃ij
g
(H)Ni,j=1 = N.  Using the contributions from the variance 
decomposition, we can define the total spillover index as measures of the contribution 
of spillovers from volatility shocks across variables in the system to the total forecast 
error variance.  The total volatility contributions from KPPS variance decompositions 
are used to calculate the Total Spillover Index: 
Sg(H) =
∑ ϑ̃ij
g
(H)Ni,j=1
i≠j
∑ ϑ̃
ij
g
(H)Ni,j=1
× 100 =
∑ ϑ̃ij
g
(H)Ni,j=1
i≠j
N
 × 100                                                          (10) 
Note that the contributions of spillovers from volatility shocks are normalized by the 
total forecast error variance.  The total spillover index, as defined by Equation (10), 
provides information not only on how much of the shocks to volatility spillovers 
across the Australian national electricity market, but also to identify directional 
spillovers using the normalized elements of the generalized variance decomposition 
matrix.  The directional spillover indices are calculated to measure spillovers from 
market 𝑖 to all markets 𝑗, as well as the reverse direction of transmission from all 
markets 𝑗 to market 𝑖, using equations (11) and (12), respectively: 
𝑆.→𝑖
𝑔 (H) =
∑ ϑ̃ji
g
(H)Nj=1
i≠j
∑ ϑ̃
ij
g
(H)Ni,j=1
× 100                                                                                        (11)            
13 
 
𝑆𝑖←.
𝑔 (H) =
∑ ϑ̃ij
g
(H)Nj=1
i≠j
∑ ϑ̃
ij
g
(H)Ni,j=1
× 100                                                                                        (12)            
The difference between total shocks transmitted to market i and those transmitted 
from market i to all markets is defined as the net volatility spillover [Equations (11) 
and (12)]. Therefore, net pairwise spillovers indices are calculated for each K pairs of 
markets:  
Sij
g(H) =
ϑ̃ji
g
(H)
∑ ϑ̃
ik
g
(H)Ni,k=1
−
ϑ̃ij
g (H)
∑ ϑ̃
jk
g (H)Nj,k=1
× 100 =
ϑ̃ji
g (H)−ϑ̃ij
g
(H)
N
× 100                                 (13) 
The following sections report the Total Spillover Index to examine the volatility 
spillover indices across the four Australian electricity markets, while the directional 
spillovers are also used to illustrate the relative contribution of each market to the 
remaining markets.   
2.3.Measuring asymmetric spillovers 
This sub-section develops a methodology to differentiate volatility spillovers from 
positive returns S
+
 and negative returns S
-
 ; the same differentiation has to be made 
for directional spillovers from volatility due to negative returns 𝑆𝑖←∙
−  , 𝑆𝑖→∙
−  , and 
positive returns 𝑆𝑖←∙
+  , 𝑆𝑖→∙
+  . To estimate the asymmetric volatility spillovers we have 
to replace the vector of volatilities 𝑅𝑉𝑡 = (𝑅𝑉1𝑡,⋯,𝑅𝑉𝑛𝑡)
′
either with the vector of 
negative semivariances 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− = (𝑅𝑆1𝑡
− , … , 𝑅𝑆𝑛𝑡
− )′  or with the vector of positive 
semivariances  𝑅𝑆𝑡
+ = (𝑅𝑆1𝑡
+ , … , 𝑅𝑆𝑛𝑡
+ )′ . We also use a moving window of 200 steps 
to take into account of the tie-varying behavior of the volatility spillover indices, 
while these spillovers are symmetric once 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− = 𝑅𝑆𝑡
+.  
 
2.3.1. Spillover Asymmetry Measure 
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We can define a spillover asymmetry measure (SAM) to estimate the degree of 
volatility spillovers as: 
𝑆𝐴𝑀 = 100 ×
𝑆+−𝑆−
1
2⁄ (𝑆
++𝑆−)
  (14) 
where S
+ and
 S
-
 are volatility spillover indices due to positive and negative 
semivariances, respectively, using h-step-ahead forecasts at time t.  The magnitude of 
SAM as measured in Equation (14), quantifies the degree of asymmetry in spillovers 
due to the presence of 𝑅𝑆𝑡
+ and 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− . The volatility spillovers associated with 𝑅𝑆𝑡
+ 
dominate those associated with 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− at time t when SAM is positive, and vice versa.  
When the value of SAM is zero, it indicates that the spillovers from 𝑅𝑆𝑡
+ and 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− are 
equal.  
 
3. Empirical results  
In this section we summarize the results of the volatility spillover analysis of the 
NEM. Our findings are presented and divided into three parts. We first present the 
dynamics of spillovers and show important features of volatility transmission in NEM. 
Secondly, we show the issues of understanding the informational content on 
asymmetric volatility transmission as resulted from negative and positive shocks (i.e., 
bad and good volatility). The last part investigates the validity of the asymmetric 
directional spillovers mechanism. Note that before accessing the empirical estimation, 
we have tested the realized volatility and semivariances at hand for unit roots using 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with augmentation lag length selected using 
information criteria, and allowing for linear trend under the alternative. We found 
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overwhelming evidence against the unit root in all tested series, supporting the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity of the electricity volatilities.
v
   
3.1. Extent to which uncertainty spills over NEM 
Table 2 decomposes total volatility spillovers indices for different regions in the 
Australian electricity market; it also displays values of net-spillover indices indicating 
net-contributors and net-recipients of volatility spillovers across different markets.  
The findings document that the Total Spillover Index for volatility is 52.445%. The 
contribution of volatility in New South Wales (NSW) to the rest of markets is the 
highest, as named in the row “Contribution to Others”, are 61.107%, while 
Queensland contributes the less to other markets, with contribution of 40.645%. 
Following New South Wales, the contribution of volatility spillovers to other regions 
are: 59.838% (Victoria), 48.194% (South Australia), and 40.645% (Queensland)
vi
.  
Hence, we can conclude that: shocks from QLD have the smallest influence, shocks 
from NSW have the largest effect, and QLD is also the one which is influenced less 
than the others by the presence of shocks. The significant role of NSW in terms of 
volatility spillover may be explained by the fact that the largest generation capacity is 
found in NSW. Worthinghton and Higgs (2017) find that the generation mix used for 
producing electricity exerts a strong influence on both the mean and the volatility of 
wholesale electricity prices, especially when these prices are expected to increase 
markedly with the increasing utilization of gas-fired generation used to support the 
intermittent and variable production from renewables and from the policy-driven use 
of renewables wind power associated with the current renewable energy target and 
carbon taxation scheme. Moreover, changes in the energy generation mix place 
                                                          
v
 These results are available upon request from authors.  
vi
 Note that electricity consumption by region follows a similar pattern as of volatility spillover indices, 
where New South Wales is the highest and Victoria follows.  
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extreme pressure on the operation of this regional electricity market. Thermal 
generators have historically been relied upon for their capacity at times of peak 
demand and for their contribution to the management of system frequency, while their 
output has declined since it is the value of the energy they generate that is gradually 
being eroded by the substitution of coal and gas for wind and solar with their inherent 
‘free energy’ characteristics (Nelson and Orton, 2016). Therefore, the electricity 
market should need a new wholesale pricing model that reflects the very high-fixed 
cost nature of technologies required for the electricity system to decarbonize.  
Moreover, the column named “From others” shows volatility received from 
other regions. It is intriguing to note that New South Wales is not only the largest 
volatility contributor to the Australian NEM, but also receives 62.239% of volatility 
from the remaining markets
vii
. Two regions are net-contributors of volatility in the 
market, namely Queensland and South Australia. In particular, New South Wales 
contributes 61.107% of volatility to other markets, especially, to Victoria (27.169%), 
followed by Queensland (18.461%), and South Australia (15.474%). In return, New 
South Wales receives 62.379% of volatility from the markets, especially, from 
Victoria (27.027%)
viii
, followed by Queensland (18.621%), and South Australia 
(16.749%). Overall, New South Wales receives 1.29% more than what it contributes 
to the remaining electricity markets. 
Moreover, as pair-wise comparison of pattern on volatility spillovers across  
regions, we aware that regions contributing to volatility spillovers to New South 
Wales are similar to those in regions receiving spillovers from New South Wales (for 
                                                          
vii
 Volatility received from other regions, including Victoria (27.027%), Queensland (18.621%), and 
South Australia (16.749%).  
viii
 For the pair of NSW-VIC, this highly interconnected market can be explained by the long-standing 
spot electricity markets of NSW and VIC, which are linked by the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric 
Scheme (Higgs, 2009).  
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example New South Wales contributes 18.461% to Queensland , while at the same 
time it receives 18.624% from Queensland)
ix
. The same pattern holds for other 
regions as well.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We also plot the Total Volatility Spillover index using a 200-day rolling window 
estimation, and horizon h=10. The total volatility spillover is presented in Figure 1, 
which shows the dynamics of the volatility spillovers across the NEM. As the time 
span is 16 year (i.e., using all-time series data available), the results contain rich 
dynamics and patterns. The rolling window estimation provides a comprehensive 
synthesis on the time-varying behavior of volatility spillovers. On average, spillovers 
from volatility are not so large, with a value of 50%, but the time-varying spillover 
index exhibits a great degree of fluctuation around the volatility spillover indices, 
ranging from about 30% to 70% (Figure 1). This result implies that shocks from one 
market do not necessarily and substantially impact the volatility of other electricity 
markets over the whole sample period, but the degree of volatility spillover varies 
over time.  
The results also show a relatively weak connectedness of NEM from 1999 to 
2001, as the national market commenced operation as a wholesale spot market for 
electricity just in December 1998 and it took two years for the NEM to become a 
better integrated single electricity market. Another intriguing observation on 
spillovers indices is that it varies between 50% - 70% from year 2002 to 2010, while 
these figures decreased to 30% - 60% starting from year 2010. This observation in the 
                                                          
ix Higgs (2009) examines the degree of electricity market integration across New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia and Victoria from 1 January 1999–31 to December 2007. Using the methodology of constant conditional 
correlation, the author finds evidence that two pairs of market (NSW- QLD and NSW-VIC) are highly 
interconnected vis-à-vis the remaining pairs. He further argues in favor of the introduction of Queensland and New 
South Wales Interconnector (QNI) on February 18, 2001.  
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later regime (i.e., from 2010 to 2016) may be due to the combination of an increased 
use of renewable energy and the introduction of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) 
on the first of July 2012, with a planned transition to an emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) in July 2015
x
 . We expect the degree of electricity market connectedness 
decreases in the future because of market barriers due to the presence of the ETS 
scheme that makes the market less competitive.  We expect the degree of electricity 
market connectedness to decrease in periods where certain market barriers, i.e. the 
period in which the ETS scheme was in full operation, could make the market less 
competitive and/or less efficient. In addition, these results could also indicate not only 
the limited nature of the interconnectors across the Australian regional markets that 
prevents full integration, but also the fact that shocks in these markets could have an 
asymmetric nature and thus, affecting differently price volatility. For instance, in 
periods of abnormally high demand, the NEM may be offsetting the ability of regional 
participants to exert market power, while there exists an inability of the current 
network of interconnectors to lead to an integrated national electricity market, which 
may indicate the presence of sizeable differences in spot prices across the Australian 
regions, with such differences remaining either for a short or long term, validating the 
need for new regional interconnectors that will smooth out volatility spillovers across 
these regions. This suggests that the main drivers of the interaction between regional 
electricity markets are both any geographical proximity and the number and size of 
interconnectors, which also reinforces any calls for the privatisation of some 
electricity market participants to improve competition, given that the overwhelming 
majority of these remain under public sector control. At the same time, electricity 
prices, along with their volatility, are heavily influenced by their fuel costs. Given that 
                                                          
x The aim of this scheme was to encourage producers to switch away from coal-fired generation and adapt natural 
gas and renewable sources of energy. 
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the short-run cost of generation for renewable (i.e., solar and wind) power is very low 
(their fuel is essentially free once the plant is built), they generally bid at prices lower 
than fossil fuel generators. Therefore, it is possible that downward pressure is placed 
on the wholesale electricity market, because higher cost generators are prevented from 
being dispatched by lower cost renewable energy generators. Therefore, by increasing 
the use of renewables and, consequently, the supply of electricity volumes is expected 
to decrease dispatch price volatility.  
The factors contributing to a less integrated market, as well as to lower 
connectedness and lower volatility spillover from 2010 to 2016 are complex, 
including uncertain demand and the use of renewable energy. Wind power is rapidly 
expanding as a form of renewable energy in Australian and it accounted for 4.9% of 
Australia’s total electricity demand and 33.7% of total renewable energy supply in 
2015
xi
. In particular, 26% of electricity was generated and consumed from wind 
power in South Australia and 54% of Australia installed wind capacity is located in 
South Australia.   
Cutler et al. (2011) use 30-mins market data on electricity prices of South 
Australian from September 2008 to August 2010 to examine the potential 
implications of expanded wind generation in South Australia. Their findings suggest 
that electricity demand is the main factor affecting electricity spot prices in South 
Australia, while wind power also has an influence on its spot prices. An intriguing 
result is that there is an apparent negative correlation between wind generation and 
price in this electricity market. Additionally, they show that periods of high wind 
output are associated with negative price events. However, the authors also admit that 
wind power outputs may enhance our understanding of extreme price events, but the 
                                                          
xi
 For details, see https://www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/technologies/wind-energy.html 
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use of wind power generation is difficult to be predicted in general
xii
.  The above 
observations together with the use of a national green tradable certificate scheme 
imply a change in regional demand and prices, as well as regional price volatility 
transmission within other states within the NEM.  
Figueiredo, da Silva, and Cerqueira (2016) use logit and non-parametric 
models to estimate the probability of market splitting occurrence between two Danish 
bidding areas; they conclude that market splitting probability between West and East 
Denmark increases (i.e., decreases in the degree of price convergence or market 
integration) when there is an increase of wind power generation share in both West 
and East Denmark.  We pair the above insights and evidence with the time-varying 
total spillover index as presented in Figure 1. We can observe that the process of 
advancing renewable energy and emissions trading scheme is highly correlated with 
the decrease of spillovers from early 2010s on.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The directional spillovers FROM and TO a particular electricity market are indicated 
in Figure 2. The dynamic patterns of volatility flows from one market to another 
market are represented in the first row of Figure 2, while the degree and the direction 
of volatility that a specific market receives is indicated in the second row. We also 
provide the dynamic patterns of net directional spillovers that an electricity market 
receives or donates from/to other markets. Some new observations emerge: both New 
South Wales and Victoria play a major role in volatility transmission in the Australian 
NEM.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
                                                          
xii
 Factors affecting electricity prices include an uncertain demand and generator bidding strategies.  
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3.2. Asymmetric Transmission of Information in Electricity Markets 
 
We examine the possibility of asymmetries in relevance to the electricity price 
volatility transmission mechanism, taking into account the argument of difference in 
the magnitude of volatility spillovers due to the originality of shocks (i.e., from 
positive or negative returns). Figure 3 computes negative and positive volatility 
spillovers and quantifies to what extent electricity markets process information 
asymmetrically. We aim to identify time episodes during which spillovers are 
attributed to negative and positive volatility. The Spillover Asymmetry Measure 
(SAM) is presented in Figure 3, with positive values suggesting that volatility 
spillovers for the sake of positive returns are larger than spillovers owing to negative 
returns. Negative values of SAM suggest that volatility spillovers for the sake of 
positive returns are larger than spillovers owing to negative returns. A zero SAM 
shows that the influence of both negative and positive spillovers is equivalent and 
they act against each other with the same magnitude. The SAM in Figure 3 reveals 
that asymmetries in total spillovers are driven by either negative or positive shocks, 
while even the extent of asymmetry is not substantial in magnitude
xiii
.   
The  first  period  of  prolonged positive  returns  drives  volatility  spillovers  
in  electricity  markets (2006-2011); this observation may be associated with an 
increase in electricity prices due to an escalating electricity demand, combined with a 
drought across most regions during the period 2006-2008, followed by a succession of 
hot summers caused the presence of peak demand during the period 2008-2009. The 
high demand for electricity was also reflected by historical peaks of almost 900 
Terawatt hour’s electricity traded in electricity futures contracts during the period 
                                                          
xiii
 This result implies that the regulations are efficient in controlling negative shocks on volatility 
spillovers across markets.  
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2009-2010. It is found that generators in South Australia exercised market power 
during 2008-2011 (Mountain, 2012). The 72 highest priced settlement periods (i.e., 
peak price) during the period 2007-2011 caused the average annual electricity prices 
in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland to rise by 30%, 37% and 32%, 
respectively
xiv
.  Moreover, it is also evident that higher spot prices have flowed into 
higher contract prices, hence, both generators and retailers have benefitted from 
higher spot prices that occurred in the period from 2008 to 2011.  
The  second  period  of  prolonged negative  returns  drives  volatility  
spillovers  in  electricity  markets (2011 to date); this observation may be associated 
with several policy reforms, including the adoption of a carbon tax policy 
implemented from July 2012 to July 2014. This carbon scheme affected power 
production from fossil fuels, regardless of the specific physical location of the power 
plant. The impact of the introduction of a carbon tax altered the marginal cost of 
electricity in a homogeneous way across Australian markets, while it affected the 
electricity costs of those power supply systems that are more carbon intensive, and, 
thus, it enhanced the different costs of power supply. The rising uptake of wind 
energy from 2009–2010 combined with a falling demand drove spot prices to fall to 
their historical lows in 2011-2012. Baruník, Kocenda, and Vacha (2016) use the same 
econometric methodology to quantify asymmetries in volatility spillovers that emerge 
due to bad and good volatility across 21 U.S. stocks. The authors conclude that 
negative spillovers provide larger magnitudes of volatility transmission. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
                                                          
xiv
 Hu, Grozev, and Batten (2005) examine the strategic bidding and rebidding behavior of Australia’s 
NEM for the period from May 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003. They conclude that larger generators are more 
likely to use capacity offers rather than price offers to control market prices. They also provide 
evidence that larger generators are capable of pushing market prices higher during peak periods by 
abusing or taking advantage of market rules and supply a shortage during these peak periods. 
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Conclusion 
This study presented evidence on the presence of asymmetric inter-relationships of 
the presence of volatility spillovers across electricity markets in Australia. The data 
consisted of 5-minute electricity prices. The results indicated that such volatility 
spillovers exhibits asymmetries in total spillovers as driven by negative or positive 
shocks.  
The findings make a significant contribution in estimating asymmetric 
volatility and the efficiency of the Australian electricity market in a study that had not 
been previously undertaken in the electricity market context. The assessment of these 
volatility spillovers across Australian regional electricity markets (except that of 
Western Australian) is expected to enhance our understanding of the spot electricity 
dynamics by electricity producers, transmitters and retailers, as well as the efficient 
distribution of energy on a national level. In a essence, the findings can be used in 
future research venues to easier identify how a range of shocks (usually related to the 
supply of various energy sources that help to generate electricity) can impact the 
provision of electricity and, thus, the forecasting of electricity prices, which is 
expected to minimize the impact of different risk factors embedded across these 
markets in the case of the Australian regions. The associated implications have to do 
with certain investment strategies the energy policy makers and regulators need to 
adopt. More specifically, regulators are expected to gain higher information on the 
reasons for why particular electricity markets are relatively more volatile than the 
others by exploring a number of potential factors for the presence of frequent and 
extreme volatility, including the abuse of market power, higher-than-expected 
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demand, unexpected capacity bottlenecks, plant outages, poorly developed 
transmission networks, changes in purchasing and contracting behavior, fluctuant 
renewable electricity generation, inappropriately designed market mechanisms, and 
potential information asymmetries. Additionally, the satisfactory pricing performance 
in these markets requires a sufficient regulatory perspective, while accommodating 
certain price regularities and irregularities. The identification of asymmetries in these 
markets will also allow regulators to investigate the presence of volatility persistence, 
which will provide further information on why volatility in some markets may take a 
longer time to die out following a shock. Power generators may utilize the empirical 
findings to optimize the terms of agreed contracts and, hence, to efficiently participate 
in the day-ahead and real-time markets. As a result, power generators that wish to 
secure a stable flow of income may prefer to avoid adopting contracts for volatile 
hours. The findings will also let both small and large consumers create an optimal 
bidding strategy. In particular, risk-averse small and large consumers may choose to 
buy electricity capacity through bilateral contracts, rather than from spot markets if 
prices in the latter are highly volatile.  
The results also illustrate that the NEM is not yet strongly integrated, with 
interstate trade representing only a small fraction of total generation. During periods 
of peak demand, the interconnectors can become congested and the NEM is separated 
into its regions, promoting price differences across markets and exacerbating 
reliability problems, as well as the market power of regional utilities. Ongoing 
challenges remain in implementing efficient transmission pricing strategies with a 
view to strengthening interconnection as a check on regional market power and 
extending retail access to all consumers.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for electricity markets realized volatility, and semivariances 
over the sample period extending from December 8, 1998 through May 5, 2016. 
 Mean St.dev.  Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum  
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Panel A: Annualized RV^(1/2) 
    NSW 1034 1750.24 6.07303 53.2665 85.9215 26615.3 
OLD 1778.9  3310.73 3.86584 20.4065 73.86 27316.9 
SA  1807.1  2912.51 4.03002 23.8955 122.322 26450.3 
VIC 1125.72 1916.21 6.35826 58.4933 81.1657 27336.3 
       Panel B Annualized RS+^(1/2) 
    
       NSW 741.558 1254.31 6.20579 56.5206 59.1111 20793.7 
OLD 1261.29 2342.88 3.90873 20.9951 51.5242 20592.2 
SA  1284.69 2062.92 4.06036 24.3357 79.5017 19235.9 
VIC 805.008 1361.58 6.35123 58.2635 56.0554 17918.1 
       Panel C Annualized RS-^(1/2) 
    
       NSW 718.064 1222.16 5.98987 51.3097 61.8822 16613.1 
OLD 1250.71 2341.2  3.84567 20.0789 52.9204 17949.2 
SA  1266.61 2058.63 4.03358 23.9615 86.5498 20389.6 
VIC 784.059 1349.97 6.42446 60.0948 58.6997 20644.9 
       
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Volatility Spillover Table Rows(To), Columns (From) 
 
   NSW QLD SA VIC From Net Conclusion 
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Others 
NSW 37.603 18.621 16.749 27.027 62.397 -1.290 net-recipient 
QLD 18.461 59.540 9.648 12.352 40.466 0.180 net-contributor 
SA 15.474 9.088 54.979 20.460 45.022 3.172 net-contributor 
VIC 27.169 12.937 21.796 38.098 61.902 -2.064 net-recipient 
Contribution 
61.107 40.645 48.194 59.838 
      
to others**       
Contribution 
98.710 100.185 103.172 97.936 
      
including own***       
        
        
      
TOTAL 52.445 
                
Notes: *From Others - directional spillover indices measure spillovers from all regions j to region i; 
**Contribution to others - directional spillover indices measure spillovers from region i to all regions j; 
***Contribution including own - directional spillover indices measure spillovers from region i to all regions j, 
including contribution from own innovations to region i; Other columns contain net pairwise (i,j)-th spillovers 
indices. NSW, QLD, SA, VIC  represent  New South Wales, Queensland,  South Australia, and Victoria, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1:  Total spillover plot: spillovers from volatility on the NEM market over the sample period 
spanning from December 8th, 1998 to May 5th, 2016.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Directional spillover plots: Directional spillovers FROM (first row), TO (second row) and 
Net spillovers (third row) on RV).  
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Figure 3:  Spillover Asymmetry Measure 
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